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1. Introduction 
Brander and Spencer (1984) showed that an activist government can use tariffs as 
a welfare improving policy tool in an imperfectly competitive market. Government 
intervention in these markets increases domestic welfare by transferring rents from 
the foreign to the domestic economy. The majority of the strategic trade policy 
literature investigates the welfare effects of policy instruments in homogeneous or 
horizontally differentiated industries. However, its effect in vertically differenti-
ated industries has not been investigated so faro There are severa! reasons why 
this is an interesting issue. 'frade volume has been increasing inside trading blocks 
and intra industry trade is a substantial part of this trade. Intra industry trade 
characterized by different levels of quality is in fact a significant proportion of 
trade (see, Greenaway, Hine and Millner (1994) among others). Nonetheless, the 
effects of strategic trade policy in this dimension have not been studied. Further, 
as a result of the existence of various levels of quality the rent transfer effects to 
the domestic country are unlike those observed in the existing literature. 
Similar to horizontally differentiated markets, in vertically differentiated mar-
kets there are two effects of a tariff, the profit transfer and the tariff revenues 
accrUÍng to the home government. These may, however, work in a fundamen-
tally different manner depending on whether the government is able, or not able, 
to commit to a specific pOlicyl. For instance, the home government can induce 
leapfrogging by not committing to a tariff when the foreign firm initially produces 
the high quality good. This results in the home firm producing the high quality 
good thus making a substantially higher level of profits. This profit transfer from 
the foreign to the domestic firm is of a higher magnitud e in this case. Note, this 
possibility of leapfrogging, that does not exist in horizontally differentiated mar-
kets, changes the market structure fundamentally. Further, the now low quality 
(leapfrogged) foreign firm pays tariff revenues to the home government. Thus, 
for the home government taxing a high quality good results in greater rent trans-
fers (profit transfer + tariff revenues) than taxing a low quality good where no 
leapfrogging takes place. 
A similar argument applies when the domes tic government subsidizes the home 
firm and is unable to commit to a subsidy. The subsidy induces exit of the foreign 
firm and the domestic firm becomes the only (high) quality producer. In this 
lMaskin and Newberry (1990) were aroongst the first to investigate the issue of credibility 
in International Thade policy. 
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case the domestie government pays a higher subsidy than if the foreign firm had 
remained the high quality produeer. 
Given that this asymmetry in rent transfers exists the role of publie poliey in 
vertically differentiated industries becomes all the more important. There exist 
some examples where the poliey makers target onIy a eertain segment of the mar-
ket. In the recent trade dispute between the U.S. and Japan, the U.S. government 
threatened sanetions only on the imports of luxury ears made by the J apanese. 
India allows imports of onIy luxury wrist watehes with a substantial tariff. It 
seems that policy makers are resorting to policies targeted at specific segments of 
a market. 
Regarding time consistency, Leahy and Neary (1994, 1995) show that the 
ability of the government to commit, or not, to a policy tool has important welfare 
implications. If the government can credibly eommit to a subsidy, domestic welfare 
is always higher in their model. By committing to a level of R&D subsidy the 
government induces a lower level of R&D expenditure for the foreign firm thus 
improving home welfare. Thereby, it is able to avoid the decrease in the market 
share of the home fum in case that the foreign fum invests more in R&D. Thus, 
eommitment crucially affects the choice of the strategic variable for the foreign 
firm and domestic welfare. Further, Goldberg (1995) shows that in a game where 
the firms first choose capacities, precornmitment is not necessary if the home 
firm invests in capacity. The home firm can thus signal to the government by 
cornmitting to a capacity and as a result even the time-consistent subsidy is 
positive (for certain parameter values), though, smaller than the subsidy under 
precommitment. 
In this paper we study the imposition of tariffs and subsidies in a vertically 
differentiated industry when the government can/cannot credibly commit to a 
level of tariff/subsidy. A domestic and a foreign firm seU in the home market. We 
show that, time consistent tariffs ensure that the domestic fum always produces 
the high quality good. When the foreign fum produces the high quality good, it 
leapfrogs its rival and starts producing the low quality good. This happens as the 
foreign firm knows that it will face a much higher tariff if it produces the higher 
quality. As foreign fum's investment in quality is sunk, once it invests in quality, 
the domestic government can safely expropriate its gross profits by choosing the 
appropriate tariff moving lasto Domestic welfare is higher under non-credible 
tariffs than under precommitment. Thus, laek of eommitment eould be a poliey 
tool in itself at the disposal of the government in the framework of OUT model. 
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Further, we present results on time consistent subsidies where we show that 
contrary to Goldberg the time consistent subsidy is always positive and results in 
a domestic monopoly as the foreign firm exits the market. This happens because 
firms know that the subsidy the domestic firm receives depends on the quality it 
will choose. Hence, if the government moves after the firms do the foreign firm 
will not enter the market and the domestic fum will choose the maximum quality 
level. As a result precornmitment on the part of the domestic government always 
gives higher domes tic welfare. This result is similar to Leahy and Neary where 
commitment to a subsidy increases domestic welfare. 
In Section 2 we present the vertical product differentiation model. In Section 
3 we study non-credibility and leapfrogging when the government uses tariffs as a 
policy tool. Both the cases where the foreignj domestic firm produces the highjlow 
quality good and vice-versa are analyzed. In Section 4 we study credible tariffs 
for the two cases mentioned aboye and the welfare implications of the presence, 
and absence, of precornmitment. In section 5 we analyze time consistent subsidies 
and their welfare implications. Section 6 is the conclusion. 
2. The madel 
We consider the simple case of two countries, foreign and domestico There are two 
firms, one located in each country and producing a vertically differentiated good. 
High quality is indexed as SI and low quality as S2, such that SI > S2 always. We 
concentrate on the effects of a tariffjsubsidy in the domestic market alone. There 
is a continuum of consumers in the domestic market, each is identified by his taste 
parameter O, where O is uniformly distributed over the interval [O, O] with density 
one; O then represents the size of the market. A COnsumer O has a unitary demand 
for the good and his utility function is, 
u = { (OSi - p) if he buys one unit of the good of quality Si· (2.1) 
O otherwise. 
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Total costs are, C(Si, Xi) = CXi + %' i = 1,2. That is, the marginal cost of pro-
duction is independent of the quality level and the quality costs are fixed costs. 
This specification of costs captures the distinctive characteristic of (pure) verti-
cal differentiation models. Shaked and Sutton (1983) define a purely vertically 
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differentiated industry as the one where the costs of quality improvement fall pri-
marily on fixed costs and involve only a modest rate of increase in unit variable 
costs. Following Sutton (1992), we assume that, as firms bear the quality costs in 
the first stage, these are sunk costs in the production stage. We further assume, 
without 1088 of generality, that the marginal cost, c, is zero for both firms. 
The sequence of moves is as follows. At time 'O' the govermnent announces its 
decision to impose a tariff on the foreign fum (or, give a subsidy to the domestic 
firm). Note, the govermnent may, or may not, choose to commit to a level of 
tariffjsubsidy. Both cases are subsequently analyzed. 
If the government can credibly commit to a tariffjsubsidy, then it moves first 
and chooses the level of tariffjsubsidy. Then firms simultaneously choose their 
qualities Si bearing the costs of their qUality selection. On the other hand, if the 
government is unable to commit, the firms select their qualities prior to the policy 
choice - the level of tariffjsubsidy - of the government. In the last stage, firms 
simultaneously choose quantities. The game is solved using subgame perfectness. 
The demand for the low and high quality good is first derived. The consumer 
indifferent between buying the high, or low, quality good has the taste parameter 
()12 = [;~ :::;;]. The consumer indifferent between buying the low quality good 
and not buying at all has the taste parameter ()02 = ~. Now, all the consumers 
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for whom O ;::: () ;::: ()12 purchase good with quality SI. All consumers for whom 
()12 > () > ()02 will purchase quality S2. Those described by () < ()02 do not buy the 
good. 
The demands for the high and low quality good are given by, 
( ) PI - P2 P2 D2 Pl,P2 = --
SI - 82 82 
This gives us the inverse demands, 
3. N on-credibility and leapfrogging under tariffs 
3.1. Optimal tariffs 
As any announcement of the tariff by the government is not credible the firms 
will ignore any such announcement and will make their quality choice as if the 
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goverrunent chooses its policy after the firms' selection of quality. Non-committal, 
thus always implies that the goverrunent moves after the firms have made their 
quality choice2• As wiIl become clear later a non-cornmittal goverrunent has the 
strategic advantage of being a second mover when the policy instrument is a 
tariff. We analyze both the cases where the foreign firm initially produces the 
high quality or, the low quality. 
3.1.1. Foreign firm high-quality 
Let l be the specific tariff imposed on the high quality foreign firmo For analytical 
convenience, define t = ~. Then the (gross) profits of firm-1 and firm-2 are, 71"f = 
PI (Xl, X2) Xl - tOX1 and 71"f = P2 (XI, X2) X2. From the first order conditions (foes) 
the best response functions for the foreign and the domestic firm are obtained: 
(3.1) 
It is now easY to see how the tariff affects the foreign firms' best response function. 
The tariff effectively increases the marginal cost of the foreign firmo Thus, due to 
the downward shift of the reaction function, the market share of firm-1 decreases 
and that of firm-2 increases (see figure 1)3. 
< figure-1 here > 
Then the equilibrium outputs are, 
* _ [281 - 82 - 2t] -(j. Xl - , 
481 - 82 
X; = [ 81 + t ]"8 
481 - 82 
(3.2) 
2 
and the equilibrium net profits, 71"; = 8iX;2 -1-, i = 1,2. 
In the second stage the government decides on the optimal tariff that maxi-
mizes total domes tic welfare taking as given the quality choices of the foreign and 
the domestic firmo Total welfare (TW) is defined as the sum of consumer surplus 
(CS), the domestic firm's net profits (71";) and tariff revenues (tOxi). CS is given 
by, 
2 As the tariff is imposed on the firm's per unit output, it seems logical that the firm will 
always ignore any announcement by a non-commital government made before it (the fum) 
chooses its quality 
3This is the market share effect in Brander .and Spencer. 
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(3.3) 
Using (3.2) and (2.2), and after some manipulations, we get: 
TW = [8~ + 8182 + 28 1t - 3t21rl_ 8~ 
2(481-82) 2 (3.4) 
Given the quality choice of the foreign and the domestic firm, maximizing TW 
with respect to t, we obtain the optimal tariff, t* = 3-0. The tarifI that maximizes 
domestic welfare is proportional to the foreign firm's quality and increases with 
the size of the market, O. Obviously, this optimal tariff is independent of the 
quality costs as these costs are already sunk for the firrns. 
3.1.2. Foreign firm low-quality 
A similar analysis can be conducted when the foreign firm is of low quality. The 
gross profit functions for the domestic and the foreign fum are as aboye, except 
that the tariff revenues,tOx2, are now subtracted from firm-2's profits. From the 
focs we obtain the best response functions (see figure 2)4 
081 - X2 S 2 
Xl = 281 
< figure-2 here > 
Then the equilibrium outputs are 
2 
and the equilibrium net profits, 7ri = 8iX;2 -1-. 
(3.5) 
The Government selects a tariff in the second stage that maximizes total do-
mestic welfare which can be now expressed as, 
(3.6) 
40nce again, due to the tariff the domestic firm gains and the foreign firm loses market share. 
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Prom the foes we derive the optimal tariff for the Government. Note, as before 
the optimal tariff, t, is proportional to the foreign firm's quality level and the 
size of the market, Le. t* = (~) (j. Also, as previously, the tariff is independent 
of the quality costs. The following proposition summarizes the results. . 
Proposition 3.1. For any choice of qualities by the lirms, the optimal tariff for 
a non-committal government on the high, or low, quality foreign lirm (s!) is, 
t* = (T) (j. 
3.2. Anticipating government's optimal tariff and leapfrogging 
If the foreign firm is certain that the government is unable to commit to a tariff 
then it will always anticipate the tariff policy that maximizes the total domestic 
welfare. As the foreign firm's quality costs are already sunk when the government 
decides its tariff policy, the government will choose a policy so as to expropriate 
a great part of the foreign firm's gross profits. Since the gross profits are higher 
when the foreign firm produces the high quality good, the government can raise 
more revenues by imposing a higher tariff on the high quality foreign firmo This 
is refiected on the fact that the optimal tariff is proportional to the foreign firm's 
quality, Le. t* = (T) (J. As is shown below, a high quality foreign firm, faced 
with the threat of expropriation of its gross profits, always has the incentive to 
leapfrog its low quality domestic rival. However, if it is the low-quality foreign 
firm then it still produces the low-quality good. As a result, the foreign firm will 
always produce the low quality good whenever it faces a non-cornmittal domestic 
government. 
These results are summarized in the following proposition. 
Proposition 3.2. A high-quality foreign lirm correctly anticipating the welfare 
maximizing tariff for the government, t* = (T) (J, leapfrogs its low quality rival, 
thus producing the low quality good. If the foreign lirm is low-quality then it 
still produces the low quality good. Moreover, under non-credible tariffs domestic 
welfare is greater than under free trade. 
3.2.1. Foreign firm high-quality 
\Ve first show that the foreign firm never produces the high quality good if it 
ant.icipates that. the optimal tariff of the government will be t* = (~) (j. Prom 
7 
(3.2) we get 
(3.7) 
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with the net profit functions, 7[';(817 82) = 8iX;2 -1-, i = 1,2. Define..\ = !;. Then 
the focs in the quality choice stage can be written as, 
8 (..\) = [(4 - 3..\) (16 + 3..\2)]92. 
1 9(4-..\)3 , 8 (..\) = [16(4+ ..\)]9
2 
2 9(4-..\)3 (3.8) 
To show that the foreign fum never produces the high quality good it is suf-
ficient to show that its profits, 7['1(81,82), are always negative. First, it can be 
checked that max 7['1(81782) < O for all 82 > 0.056814992. Thus, if the domestic 
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firm chooses quality 82 > 0.056814992 the foreign firm never produces the high 
quality good . We next show that the domestic fum never chooses a quality level 
82 $ 0.056814992. In fact, from the fust order conditions of the domes tic fum 
(3.8) we can check that the optimal quality for the domestic fum is always larger 
than 0.11192 (the minimum attained at ..\ = O, Le., 81 = +(0). Thus the foreign 
firm never chooses high quality if it anticipates a policy t* = 3"9. 
3.2.2. Foreign firm low-quality 
The specific tariff is now applied to the low quality foreign firmo Substituting 
t* = T in (3.5) we get, 
X
* _ 2(381 - 82) n. 
1 - ( ) u, 3 481 - 82 
(3.9) 
2 
and 7[';(81,82) = 8iX;2 -1-. Then the focs can be expressed as (with ..\ = !;), 
(3.10) 
Dividing 82(..\) by 81(..\) and solving for..\ we obtain..\* = 0.028584. Then from 
(3.10), (3.9), and (3.6) we obtain: 
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-2 Si = 0.2500070 
xi = 0.49880 
7r; = 0.03095057t 
f* = 0.0023820603 
-2 S2 = 0.007146180 
x2 = 0.08393310 
7r:Í = 0.000024818' 
es = 0.031425504 
TW = 0.06257604 
Note, while the foreign firm's net profits are positive when it produces the low 
quality, they are always negative if it produces the high quality. Hence, an initially 
high-quality foreign firm will leapfrog its domestic rival and instead produce the 
low quality good. On the other hand, a low quality foreign firm still produces the 
low quality good after the imposition of the tariff. As we will see below, domestic 
welfare is higher when the government cannot precommit to a tariff than under 
free trade. In fact, if the foreign firm produces the higher quality, free trade leads 
to TW = 0.042904~; contrarily, if the foreign firm produces the lower quality 
-4 TlV = 0.0596430 (see figures 5 and 7). 
4. Optimal tariffs under Credible Policies 
4.1. Foreign firm high-quality 
Suppose now that the government can credibly commit to a specific tariff before 
the firms select. their qualities. The firms choose their qualities in the second 
stage, given the final period equilibrium quantities (see, (3.2)). Let !; = A and 
/1 = .1.... The first order conditions can be expressed as: SI 
S (A ) = [(2 - A - 2/1) (8 - 2A + A2 + 8/1 + 2A/1)]02 (4.1) 
1 ,/1 (4-A)3 
S (A ) = [(4 + A)(l + /1)2]02 (4.2) 
2 ,/1 (4-A)3 
We first need to determine the interval of tariffs for which the foreign firm 
stays in the market. Define tm as the maximum tariff for which the foreign firm's 
profits are equal to zero. Using (4.1), (4.2), and the zero profit condition for the 
foreign firm, and solving for (t, SI, S2) we obtain tm = 0.027653902 (the associated 
quality ratio is, Am = 0.575379). This is the tariff level that leaves the foreign 
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firm indifferent between staying in the market, or exiting it. Hence, the relevant 
interval for the tariff is t E [0,0.027653992]. (Note, Jl = t = O corresponds to free 
trade, and in this case the ratio of qualities is, AO = 0.358111). 
Now, dividing expressions (4.1) and (4.2), and simplifying we obtain5, 
Solving equation (4.3) for Jl and choosing the relevant root we get Jl(A)6. 
Plotting Jl(A) it is easily seen that dJl/dA > O. Further, substituting Jl(A) in (4.1) 
and (4.2) we obtain SI(A) and S2(A). By plotting these expressions, it is seen that 
S2(A) is increasing and SI(A) is decreasing with A. 
Now, writing teA) = SI(A).Jl(A), and plotting, we see that dA/dt > O for A in 
the range [0.358111,0.575379]. Therefore, as the tariff on the imports increases, 
the foreign firm decreases and the domestic firm increases its quality (see figure-3). 
< figure-3 here> 
Define average quality, SAV, as the average of the individual qualities weighted 
by individual market shares, Le., 
S·X· + s·x· s - 1 1 2 2 
AV - • + • 
Xl X2 
(4.4) 
Using (3.2), and plotting we see that average quality increases with the tariff 
(see figure 4). This is due to the fact that both the market share and quality 
of the domestic firm increase. This more than compensates for the decrease in 
quality and output of the foreign firmo 
< figure-4 here > 
Proposition 4.1. As the specific tariff on imports becomes more restrictive, it 
leads to quality decrease by the foreign firm and quality in crease by the domestic 
firmo Average quality in the market increases with the tarifE. 
5These calculations were performed using mathematica. 
6The analytical expressions of JL(>'), Si (>.), t(>.) etc. are available from the authors upon 
request. 
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4.1.1. Welfare analysis 
We now look at the effects that a cred.ible tariff, t, has on the firms' profits, 
consumer surplus and total domestic welfare. Substituting Si(A), i = 1,2 and t(A) 
in (3.2) and (3.4) and plotting we derive the following results (see figure 5). 
< figure-5 here > 
As expected, the profits of the high-quality foreign firm, 7ri, are maximum 
under free trade and decrease with the level of the tariff (being zero for the maxi-
mum tariff t m ). As the tariff transfers rents to the domestic producer, the profits 
of the domestic firm, 7r2' increase with the tariff and are maximum at t m • Con-
sumer surplus decreases initialIy as total output decreases with the tariff, then 
increases due to the (average) quality upgrading. Consumer surplus is maximum 
under free trade. Total domestic welfare is, however, maximized at the maxi-
mum tariff tm . More interestingly, this maximum level of total domestic welfare 
(maxTW = 0.05315(4 ) is lower than when the government cannot credibly com-
mit to a tariff (TW = 0.062576(4 ). This is explained by the fact that profits of 
the domestic firm increase by an amount larger than the decrease in consumer 
surplus (as tariff revenues are zero in both cases). 
4.2. Foreign firm low-quality 
Using similar arguments as in the previous case, we can determine the foreign 
and domestic firms' qualities as functions of the level of tariff imposed on the low 
quality foreign firmo Let'x = II and fl = .i... Using (3.5), the focs can be expressed 
S2 S2 
as: 
(4.5) 
(4.6) 
The aboye equations together with the zero profit condition for the foreign 
firm determine the maximum tariff, t m = 0.0106368
2 (and the associated. ratio 
of qualities, 'xm = 3.513). Hence, the relevant range of tariff is given by t E 
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[0,0.01063682] • (Note that the free trade ratio of qualities, Xo = 1/ AO, is 2.79243). 
< figure-6 here > 
In Figure-6 the relationship between quality choice and the level of tariff pro-
tection is shown7 • As the tariff becomes more protective both fums lower their 
qualities. Interestingly, as there is a substantial shift in market shares towards 
the high quality domestic fum, average quality in the market increases with the 
tariff. The following proposition summarizes the results. 
Proposition 4.2. An in crease oEthe specific tariff on the low quality Eoreign firm 
results in quality downgrading by both the firms. However, the average quality 
in the market increases with the level oE the tariff. 
4.2.1. Welfare Analysis 
The effects of a tariff on fums' profits, consumer surplus and total domestic welfare 
are now analyzed. As in the previous case, the profits of the low-quality foreign 
firm are maximum under free trade and decrease with the tariff (becoming zero 
for the maximum tariff t m ). While the profits of the domestic firm increase with 
the tariff and are maximum at tm (when the foreign fum is indifferent between 
staying, or exiting the market) (figure-7). Consumer surplus, however, decreases 
with the tariff due to both, the downgrading of qualities and the restriction of 
total output. Total welfare again increases with the tariff and reaches its maximum 
at t m (figure-7). This is explained by the fact that profits of the domestic fum 
increase by an amount larger than the decrease in domestic consumer surplus. 
Note that, in this case too, the maximum of the domestic welfare (0.0624706(j4) 
is lower than the welfare attained when the government cannot credibly commit 
to a specific tariff (0.062576(j4)8. 
< figure-7 here > 
7The expressions for ¡¡(X), Si(X) and I(X) are available from the authors upon request. Note, 
that d>'¡ dt > O for >. in the range [2.79243, 3.513]. 
8This slight difference of domestic welfare between the present case and the case of non-
credible tariffs cannot be attributed to approximation errors as the optimal tariff is much higher 
-2 2 
under precommitment (tm = 0.0106360 > t* = 0.00238060 ). 
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4.3. Discussion 
Domestic welfare is higher when the government is unable to commit to a level of 
tarifI than when it can precommit. The reason for the improvement in welfare is 
as follows. Consider first, the case where the domestic firm initially produces the 
low quality good. A non-committal government will always choose a tarifI that 
results in leapfrogging. Anticipating a tarifI that will expropriate a large part of 
its gross profits, the foreign firm starts producing the low quality good. Thus, 
due to the imposition of the tarifI the domestic firm becomes the high quality 
producer. As the high-quality firm has a larger share of the market relative 
to the low quality firm (and a higher price), the net revenues accruing to the 
domestic firm substantially increase. Note, this effect is analogous to the effect 
in Brander and Spencer where the market share of the domestic firm increases 
due to the imposition of the tariff. However, due to leapfrogging, the increase 
in the domestic firm's profits is of a much larger magnitude under non-credible 
tariffs. In either case the domestic government gets tarifI revenues. However, as 
the optimal tarifI is lower under non-credible policies and, moreover, is applied 
on a firm whose market share is smaller, tariff revenues are lower than when the 
government precommits. Furthermore, even if the level of tariff is lower, consumer 
surplus turns out to be lower under non-credible policies. However, the positive 
profit transfer effect dominates the two negative (tariff revenue and consumer 
surplus) effects, resulting in higher domestic welfare. 
On the other hand, an (initially) low quality foreign firm remains a low quality 
producer under both types of policies. Under non-credible policies, the foreign firm 
produces a lower quality as it anticipates a tariff that will expropriate its gross 
profits. Domestic firm also lowers its quality as the competition is relaxed through 
product differentiation. As in the previous case, the optimal tarifI under non-
credible policies is lower than under precommitment, and thus tariff revenues are 
100ver, too. Moreover, the consumer surplus is again higher under precommitment. 
However, the domestic firm's profits increase substantially under non-credible 
tariffs and more than compensate for the aboye two negative efIects. As a result, 
domestic welfare increases in this case too. 
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5. Non-credibility and exit-inducing Subsidies 
5.1. Optimal Subsidies 
As in section 3, we assume that the firms make their quality choice as if the 
government selects the level of subsidy for the domestic firm after the firms have 
made their quality choice. We wiil see that, contrary to the case of tarifIs, if 
the policy instrument is a subsidy, the government has instead a second mover 
disadvantage. Both the cases, the foreign firm initially producing the high or the 
low quality, are subsequently analyzed. 
5.1.1. Foreign firm high-quality 
We first consider the output selection stage. Let the per-unit of domestic output 
subsidy be k. Define k = i. The gross profits of the firms are then, 7rr = 
Pl(Xl,X2)Xl and 7rf = P2(X¡,X2)X2 + k8x2. From the first order conditions the 
best reply functions for the foreign and the domestic fum are obtained. Solving 
these we get the equilibrium outputs, 
(5.1) 
2 
and the equilibrium net profits, 7r; = SiX;2_3, i = 1,2. Note, that the government 
decides on the subsidy that maximizes total domestic welfare given the quality 
choice of the foreign and the domestic fum. Total domestic welfare (TW) is 
defined as the sum of consumer surplus (e S) plus domestic firm's net profits 
(7r2) less expenditures on subsidies (k8x2). Using (2.2), (5.1) and (3.3), it can be 
checked that, 
(5.2) 
Maximizing TW with respect to k, we obtain the optimal subsidy, k = S28j 
k*is proportional to both, the quality of the domestic firm and the market size. 
Again, note that the time consistent subsidy is independent of the quality costs. 
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5.1.2. Foreign firm low-quality 
The gross profit functions for the domes tic and foreign firm are now, 1rf = 
- G P1(X1,X2)X1 + k(}X1 and 1r2 = P2(X1,X2)X2, respeetively. From the foes we oh-
tain the equilibrium outputs, 
.. - [2(k + sd - S2]-(}. .. _ [ SI - k ]-() Xl - , x2 -4s1 - S2 4s1 - S2 (5.3) 
2 
and the net profits, 1r; = SiX; -1-, i = 1,2. 
The Government selects a subsidy that maximizes t.otal domestic welfare whieh 
is expressed as, 
TW = [k2 - 2ks1 - 3si + Sl S2]02 _ si 
2(S2 -4s1) 2 (5.4) 
From the foes the time eonsistent subsidy, k* = S10, is obtained, which is again 
proportional to the domestie firm's quality and the size of the market. 
Proposition 5.1. For any choice of qualities by the lirms, the optimal subsidy 
for a non-committal government, on the high, or low, quality domestic lirm (Sd) 
is, "k* = SdO. 
5.2. Anticipating government's optimal subsidy and exit 
It is easy to see from (5.3) that when the foreign fum produces the low quality 
good, the optimal subsidy, k* = SI, results in the foreign firm producing an output 
of zero (henee, making negative profits for any S2 > O). Thus, the provision of the 
subsidy results in a domestie monopoly. Moreover, as we will see below, a high 
quality foreign firm always makes negative profits and thus also stays out of the 
domestie market. Once more the domestie firm becomes a monopoly. 
The intuition is simple. If the foreign firm anticipates that the domestic firm 
will receive a high subsidy ex-post, and therefore its own gross profits will be 
lower, it prefers to stay out of the market to avoid the sunk costs of quality (as 
qualities are ehosen in the first stage). Thus, as the foreign fum decides to stay 
out, the domestic fum will now ehoose its quality and output as a monopoly. 
The following proposition summarizes the results (where, f stands for the foreign 
firm). 
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Proposition 5.2. Given any Sd > O and sI> O, k* = Sd and 1r I < O. Hence, the 
Eoreign lirm never produces sI > O, Le., it a1ways stays out oE the market. The 
domestic lirm is then a monopoly. 
Proof. It remains to show that the high quality foreign firm will make always 
negative profits. Substituting k* = S2 into (5.1) we obtain: 
* _ [2(Sl - S2)]-(}. * _ [ 3s1 ] -() Xl - , X 2 -4s1 - S2 4s1 - S2 (5.5) 
2 
and the net profits 1r; = sixi2 -1'-, i = 1,2. Setting A = !7 from the focs we 
obtain, 
(A) = [9(4 + A)] 02 S2 (4-A)3' 
Since S2(A) is increasing in A, the quality of the domestic fum will be larger than 
S2(0) = (196) 02. Further, from (5.5), xi decreases with S2. Hence the foreign fum's 
profits decrease with 82' That is, 1ri(Sl, S2) ::; 1ri(s¡, 82(0)) ::; maxS1 1ri(81' S2(0)) = 
- (:112 ) 0
4 (by plottillg this function we can see that the maximum is attained at 
SI = 82(0) = (196) 02 ). Thus, the high quality foreign fum will always stay out of 
the market resulting in a domes tic monopoly. 
5.3. A Domestic Monopoly 
V-le now analyze the domestic monopoly case. The monopolist will choose its 
quality anticipating a subsidy from the government. In the last stage, its profit 
function is, 7r = (O - q)sq + kOq, and hence its optimal output is: 
- -() [S + k] qm- --2s (5.6) 
and its net profits are 1rm = sq; - s;. Further, the total domestic welfare is given 
by: 
Once more, we get 'k* = sO. That is, the optimal subsidy is proportional to 
the quality of the monopolist (and also to the market size). The profits of the 
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monopolist under the time consistent subsidy (k* = s) are 7r m = s7l - s; and 
it selects quality, Sm = '02 , producing an output level of e (note, the monopolist 
sells to the entire market). Finally, if k* = Sm = '02 , it can be checked that total 
domestic welfare equals zero. 
The intuition is as follows. If the government is unable to precommit to a 
specific subsidy level, the (resulting) domestic monopolist offers a much higher 
quality good in the market in order to obtain a high subsidy by the government. 
As the subsidy it receives is quite high, the monopolist sells to the entire market at 
a very low price (in fact, the price equals marginal cost in our case). In addition, 
total subsidies are as high as the sum of producer and consumer surplus, thus 
resulting in zero domestic welfare. 
Now, it is easy to show that any small subsidy under precommitment gives 
a positive total welfare. Note, under free trade (when both the firms are active 
in the market) the total domestic welfare is O.0429062~ and O.0596441~ ,when 
the foreign firm are of low and high quality, respectiv~ly (see figures 5 and 7). 
Therefore, any arbitrarily small subsidy would also give a positive total welfare. 
Thus, the government prefers to precommit if it subsidizes the domestic firmo The 
proposition below summarizes the results. 
Proposition 5.3. Under non-credible subsidies, the (resulting) domes tic monop-
olist covers the entire market (qm = e) offering a high quality good (sm = '02 ) in 
order to obtain a high subsidy, k* = '03 , from the government. Total domestic 
welfare under the time consistent subsidy equals zero. It is better for the govern-
ment to credibly commit to a specific policy measure, since a small subsidy under 
precommitment results in a greater domestic welfare than under non-credible sub-
sidies. 
6. Conclusion 
In the absence of cornmitment we find that domestic welfare is higher when the 
government's policy tool is a tariff. However, if the government subsidizes the 
domestic firm precornmitment is important as domestic welfare is lower in its ah-
sence. If the policy tool is a tariff the optimal time-consistent tariff is proportional 
to the foreign firms' quality and the foreign firm has no incentives to produce the 
high quality good. Due to non-commitment the tariff ensures that the domestic 
17 
firm always produces the high quality good. The tariff effectively transfers rev-
enues from the (ex-ante) high-quality foreign firm to the (ex-post) high-quality 
domestic firmo This is similar to the rent transfer effect observed in Brander and 
Spencer. In our case this effect is more dramatic because quality configurations 
always change due to the optimal tariff. Therefore, the effect on welfare is even 
more dramatic. This happens due to the fact that in our vertically differenti-
ated oligopoly model the high-quality firm is always the domestic firmo We thus 
observe a transfer of rents from two sources. One, due to tariffs. Second, due 
to non-cornmitment the domestic firm always produces the higher quality good 
achieving a much higher level of profits. This increases domestic welfare. 
On the other hand, a time consistent subsidy results in the exit of the foreign 
firm from the domestic market. This results in a domestic monopoly with the 
monopolist recognizing that the time consistent subsidy depends on its choice of 
quality. The home firm then chooses the maximum quality possible which results 
in the total domestic welfare of zero. Recognizing this, the domes tic government 
would rather precornmit as any arbitrarily small subsidy under precornmitment 
leads to a positive level of domestic welfare. Precornmitment, as in Leahy and 
Neary, is also the best policy under subsidies. 
Our results are important in that they highlight that in a vertically differ-
entiated industry, under tariffs, non-cornmittal on the part of the government is 
welfare improving while the converse is true under subsidies 
A natural question arises here. If the government can cornmit to a policy 
instrument, but not to its level (as is the case in this paper) to what instrument 
will it precommit? Our analysis reveals that a non-cornmittal government will 
always impose a tariff on the foreign firmo By choosing tariffs it induces the 
foreign firm to leapfrog the domestic firm thereby producing the low quality good. 
However, if it chooses subsidies it results in a subsidized domestic monopoly. 
18 
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